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T
he thought of Friedrich Nietzsche has been called 
anti-anti-naturalistic. It is not mere naturalism, 
nor is Nietzsche's body of work simply aligned 
with the reaction against naturalism. While a tacit 
admiration for such figures, such "strong, independent spir­
its" as Plato and Kant (Kant the paradigmatic anti­
naturalist, Plato a more difficult case) is surely present, 
Nietzsche's desire to make something new in and of the his­
tory of philosophy led him to roundly criticize their ilk. A 
conscious rhetorical distancing, from either of two given 
forces within history, and central to Nietzsche. The problem 
of nature and naturalism is the paradox of a dual imma­
nence, of culture in nature and nature in culture. The 
'sourcing' of the one into the other is, alternately, natural­
ism and antinaturalism; nature as giving the rule to culture, 
or culture apart from nature and in many ways governing it 
indeed. Nietzsche is inclined to read a false antinomy into 
this distinctionl thus revealing in his reading of nature his 
prototypical methodology. 
Edward Abbey, 20th century heir to Thoreau, enjoys a 
Nietzschean encounter with the two "natures II aforemen­
tioned in his Desert Solitaire. The book's lyricism and read­
ability has rendered it ripe for cooption by those disinclined 
to read the philosophy out of the prose, establishing a firm 
bond with both Thoreau and Nietzsche. For these writers 
style is substance, in this they stand out in the history of 
philosophy. Both Nietzsche and Abbey, on whom I will 
focus l always mean what they say, though deciding exactly 
what it is they are saying is a task of great difficulty, and of 
a very different kind from that found in the case of Kant or 
Hegel. The Nietzschean methodological move mentioned 
above is one I wish to read into Abbey, and its implications, 
one I see as arising explicitly out of the anti-anti-naturalistic 
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stance. 
Early in Desert Solitaire, Abbey states his anti-anti­
naturalistic intentions: 
Like a god, like an ogre? The personification of the 
natural is exactly the tendency I wish to suppress in 
myself, to eliminate for good. I am here not only to 
evade for a while the clamor and filth and confu­
sion of the cultural apparatus but also to confront, 
immediately and directly if it's possible, the bare 
bones of existence, the elemental and fundamental, 
the bedrock which sustains us. I want to be able to 
look at and into a juniper tree, a piece of quartz, a 
vulture, a spider, and see it as it is in itself, devoid 
of all humanly ascribed qualities, anti-Kantian, 
even the categories of scientific description. To 
meet God or Medusa face to face, even if it means 
risking everything human in myself. I dream of a 
hard and brutal mysticism in which the naked self 
merges with a nonhuman world and yet somehow 
survives intact, individual, separate. Paradox and 
bedrock.iii 
The Nietzschean tension of the dual immanence of nature is 
here palpablei the desire of the subject to merge with nature 
(the world, Other) and still maintain itE? own integrity, its 
self-intelligability. Is this, though a paradox, possible? The 
advantages of both are obvious, and Nietzsche (and Abbey 
after him) seems to be asking, in his particular way, can we 
not have both? 
Nietzsche's method would seem to say, 'perhaps.' 
Not in a concrete manner, however, for part and parcel of 
Nietzsche's method is the critique of "the doer behind the 
deed," ensuring that I'The form is fluid, but the 'meaning' is 
even more SO."iv This conjoined with his assertion that 
...purposes or utilities are only signs that a will to 
power has become master of something less power­
ful and imposed upon it the character of a functioni 
and the entire history of a "thing/' an organ, a cus­
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tom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of 
ever new interpretations and adaptations whose 
causes do not even have to be related to one an­
other but, on the contrary, in some cases succeed 
and alternate with one another in a purely chance 
fashion.v 
results in a picture of understanding (and meaning)-in-the­
world. This 'resolution' of the anti-anti-naturalistic paradox 
seems to create another antinomy that unlike the dialectical 
Kantian antinomy, is held up vibrating with conflict into 
. the air, a sort of totem. The problem of nature's dual imma­
nence becomes analogous to, if not largely equivalent with, 
the problem of meaning, interpretation, and truth. Truth in 
the old sense, a static 'form' behind the world (whether that 
be nature or culture) is something Nietzsche, as is obvious, 
discards. He still speaks of 'truth,' though in a manner 
similar to his use of the word meaning. 
That is, the fluid sign-chain of interpretation that is a 
given subject'S moment in history can be adapted in ways 
that are not all created equal. I-Ie condemns a tendency he 
sees in II modern historiographYi" 1I ...it rejects all teleology; it 
no longer wishes to 'prove' anything; it disdains to play the 
judge and considers this a sign of good taste ... "vi All this 
would seem to arise necessarily out of the aforementioned, 
and Nietzsche admits to this in the same breath he critiques 
it. Nietzsche writes that the will to power in man "would 
rather will nothingness than not will. "vii AIld concludes the 
Genealogy with an assertion that "Man, the bravest of ani­
mals and the one most accustomed to suffering, does not 
repudiate suffering as such; he desires it, he even seeks it 
out, provided he is shown a l1/eaning for it- a purpose of suf­
fering,"viii Thus a necessity of meaning is, paradoxically, 
injected into the picture of an always already interpreted, 
lirelativistic," world. What demands this meaning (Den'ida: 
"coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a de­
sire."ix) is the will, and it is the will to power by which it can 
be measured, evaluated, interpreted. 
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The discussion of suffering above arises in the con­
text of remarks on the adoption of ascetic ideals as man's 
best option to date, this after sixty pages of criticism. 
Adoption of the ascetic ideal is a case of willing nothing­
ness, rather than facing the alternative. There is, for 
Nietzsche, a better option. In Beyond Good and Evil he 
writes: 
To translate man back into nature; to become mas­
ter over the many vain and overly enthusiastic in­
terpretations and connotations that have so far 
been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic 
text of homo natura; to see to it that man henceforth 
stands before man as even today, hardened in the 
discip line of science, he stands before the rest of 
nature, with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed 
Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of old meta­
physical bird catchers who have been piping at him 
all too long, 'you are more, you are higher, you are 
of a different origin!' - that may a strange and 
insane task, but it is a task - who would deny that? 
Why did we choose this insane task? Or, putting it 
differently: 'why have knowledge at all?'x 
It, the interpretation for meaning, becomes at once the as­
sumption of the most (best?) insane question a'nd its most 
rigorous and conunitted actualization. Committed, again 
in the sense that "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, 
becoming.../,xi gives a dynamic picture of interpretation. 
Perhaps to reach the ideal of the elimination of the doer, 
and to in turn embody that ideal to the point that it drops 
away, one must suffer through this insane task. Here the 
desert may be necessary. 
All this is inextricably bound up with the paradoxi­
cal II nature II of nature, as described by Abbey. It arises out 
of the problematic situation that is being-in-the-world. 
Nietzsche and Abbey share a proclivity, a desire, to point 
out that the task of "translatin.g man back into nahne" is as 
necessary as it is insane. Abbey writes "A civilization which 
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destroys what little remains of the wild, the spare, the origi­
nal, is cutting itself off from its origins and betraying the 
principle of civilization itself."xii It moves to eliminate suf­
fering, and the desert. What this principle is, I will come to 
momentarily and it will surely and again be shot through 
with paradox. Perhaps this, this problem of the dual imma­
nence of nature, this source of paradox, is the original 
"riddle of the sphinx." 
The desire for' coherence in contradiction,' for mean­
ing in interpretation, for b:uth in becoming, is pulled out of 
the dual immanence of nature. Humans are in nature, "in 
all her ·prodigal and indifferent magnificence which is out­
rageous but noble."xiii That is, in something vast and with­
out purpose. It is human desire, will to power, the IInature" 
in man that obliges, forces with violence the interpretation 
with an intent that results in coherence, both within a sub­
ject and between subjects. This invariably does violence to 
the unordered 'order,' what Nietzsche called 'the primor­
dial unity,' that is mere being-in-the-world. However, this 
"mere II is not sufficient, it does not satisfy the demand of 
the will to power, does not allow for the meaningful, mean­
ing creating discharge of the will to power.xiv This violence 
is inevitable. Nietzsche writes: 
Consider any morality with this in mind: what 
there is in it of 'nature' teaches hatred of the laisser 
aller, of any all-to-great freedom, and implants the 
need for limited horizons and the nearest task­
teaching the narrowing of our perspective, and 
thus in a certain sense stupidity, as a condition of 
life and growth.xv 
This self-limiting, self-imposed adoption of 
'morality/ of an ideal, is the necessary and agonistic resolu­
tion of the dual immanence of nature. The violence it does 
to the subject'S relation to the world is an inevitability, the 
concern only that it is taken through fully and with com­
mitment. Nietzsche writes: 
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"You shall obey - someone and for a long time: else 
you will perish and lose the last respect for your­
self" this appears to me to be the moral impera­
tive of nature which, to be sure, is neither 
"categorical" as the old Kant would have it (hence 
the "else") nor addressed to the individual (what do 
indivduals matter to her?), but to peoples, races, 
ages, classes - but above all to the whole human 
animal, to man.xvi 
This demand, instantiated by nature through culture (and 
nature's immanence in culture), creates in the conditions of 
the meaningful existence of humanity, and therefore hu­
man existence as such, a paradox. One that cannot be es­
caped. 
This paradox is inherent in existence as such because 
it gives man the power to interpret, to create meaning; it 
gives the will to power. As Nietzsche writes: 
In man creature and creator are united: in man there 
is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, 
chaos; but in man there is also creator, formgiver, 
hammer hardness, spectator divinity, and seventh 
day: do you understand this contrast?xvli 
If the creative potential in man is the only way of defining 
himself, the only interpreter, and this only comes out of a 
conscious turning away from his immanence in nature, 
then the paradoxical circle is complete. Humanity's Inean­
ing, existence, is founded on a turning away from that is at 
the same time a turning towards. The promise of meaning 
that is the primordial unity is merely a promise; humanity 
must, in this case, create their own promises in action. TILey 
must desertify, go into the desert that is heartless, that is a 
brick-walled riddle, thereby escaping a society which in­
variably enforces the old modes of meaning-creation. Enl­
bracing suffering as meaning, either physically or in. the 
ll1ind, is the desert. It is only subsumed in paradox, within 
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the desert, that meaning and interpretation, a new meta­
physics, begins. Though the desert is always something to 
be eventually left, or forgotten. 
When, in the Genealogy, Nietzsche mentions desert, it 
is briefly. A quarter of the way through his treatment of 
ascetic ideals in the Third Essay, he writes of the value of 
ascetic ideals for the IIfree spirit," that they provide motiva­
tion to" .. .all those resolute men who one day said No to all 
servitude and went into some desert: even supposing they 
were merely strong asses and quite the reverse of a strong 
spirit./lxviii Nietzsche does not deny that this strength of 
mind, of will, is valuable and something to be admired, 
even if the direction of that will, its reason, is misguided. 
This relates strongly to Nietzsche's stance on ascetic idealsi 
he does not condemn them as such, they represent what to 
date has been the best option for humanity, the best method 
for the 'insane task.' The deselt, as mentioned in the epi­
graph, need not even be a place. It is in Nietzsche a place 
£01' and of the consciousness, 'heartless,' where "no actor of 
the spirit could possibly endure li£e./Ixix 
Abbey has certainly been painted as just such a 
strong ass. His book illustrates that the difference between 
being an ass and a spirit is exceedingly fine. As Abbey 
writes, "there is a way of being wrong which is also neces­
sarily right."xx What this is for Nietzsche, as regards ascetic 
ideals, is that the cooption of such ideals is as aforemen­
tioned not necessarily negative, though the dominant ideals 
of the modern age most certainly are. It is the purity and 
strength of these ideals' initial presentation, such as in the 
Old Testament where the desert looms large, that Nietzsche 
finds so appealing. It is the perversion of these ideals that 
he finds so odious, and therein lies his condemnation of 
Plato, Christianity, and lithe Germans." It is echoed in Ab­
bey's condemnation of contemporary industrialism: "This is 
a courageous view, admirable in its simplicity and power, 
and with the weight of all modern history behind it. It is 
also quite insane. I cannot attempt to deal with it here."xxi 
Indeed. And in much the same way as Nietzsche 
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does not critique Kant on Kantls own terms, impenetrable 
task that it was constructed to be, Abbey does not engage 
with his object of ire in its own realm. He retreats, literally, 
to the desert, using it like Thoreau did as a symbolic cata­
lyst towards the state Nietzsche described as a desert. Ab­
bey's "isolation" was as profound as Thoreauls; the latter 
was often seen galumphing across the fields to the Emer­
sonls on hearing the dinner bell. However, Abbey's reflec­
tions on the desert parallel Nietzschels, in a way that re­
flects the latter's ultimate criticism of ascetic ideals. Just as 
Abbey's conclusion that the desert has no heart, that "its 
surface is also the essence"xxii results in a different view of 
truth implicit in the ceasing to be of any quest,so too does 
Nietzsche see in the externalizing tendencies of the ascetic 
ideal a violation, a tacit Idoerl tacked onto the deed. 
Nietzsche writes "All honor to the ascetic ideal insofar as it is 
honest! so long as it believes in itself and does not play 
tricks on us!" Abbey calls the industrial ideal !courageousl 
for this reason; it has a profound faith in itself and the ends 
it pursues. Despite this, there are reasons to reject it. Simi­
larly with Abbey's quest to 'understand the desert;' as long 
as he looks for a 'meaning' or 'truth' behind what he is 
standing in, Abbey fails to 'see' the meaning of most value: 
the one that views each moment as itself the meaning. This 
in turn reveals the infinite chain of meaningsj 
interpretations present in-the-world. 
Nietzsche sees an ascetic journey, whether actual or 
psychic, as at base false. It extrapolates an exterior 
'meaning' from being-in-the-world, which is invariably a 
kind of trick. Just as Abbey!s creation of a desert in his 
mind distracted him and alienated him from the desert he 
was standing in, so too do ascetic ideals isolates m.an from 
his own life. In this way, Abbey's initial asceticism in Desert 
Solitaire can be seen as similar to that of industrialism. The 
ascetic move must be overcome, and perhaps the desertify­
ing move through asceticism is the only way to found such 
a new metaphysics of immediacy. 
But can this occur? Can this return to bedrock really, 
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as Abbey dreams, resolve the paradox of the dual inlma­
nence of nature? Will it allow the subject to become self­
identical with the world at large? This last bit of rhetoric 
demonstrates how quickly absurdity is here reached. It 
must be remembered that, as Abbey writes, lithe desert is 
also a-tonal, cruel, clear, inhuman, neither romantic nor 
classical, motionless and emotionless, at one and the same 
time - another paradox - both agonized and deeply still."xxiii 
The desert is irreducible and irresolvable, a paradigm of 
nature as it is faced by culture, by man. It may be that in 
Nietzsche the origin of the nature/ culture bifurcation, 
which for Derridaxxiv among others is foundational to phi­
losophy as we have known it, begins when this base para­
dox is denied, when simplification and unneeded consoli­
dation occur- in one direction or another. This casts. 
Nietzsche's moral critique in a very foundational light, one 
which (paradoxically) admits that at the deepest level of 
critique is the simplest of maxims. Not mere laisser aller, 
but a self-ordered relevance within the world that is sim­
pler because it is sensical, sensible in the generic valence. 
Philosophy, after all, can be simpJe, and. never easy. Like 
the desert. . 
This is reflected in the works under considera tion. 
Both Nietzsche and Abbey were brilliant stylists, and Be­
yond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, and Desert 
Solitaire represent the apex of their mutual attempts to em­
body their philosophies within their literary efforts. Much 
has been made of how both authors contradict themselves 
often, and how this lends itself to oversimplified misinter­
pretation by those readers not as exacting as Nietzsche him­
self called for. There are profound differences between the 
two, Nietzsche far outreaches Abbey as a thinker (or mis­
sionary), while the genres in which they were working 
makes a literary comparison facile and pointless. Most im­
portant are tl1e intersections, their stances concerning na­
ture as detailed above, and the variegated paradox it dic­
tated, as one commentator has noted, applies to Nietzsche 
as much as Abbey: 
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The polyphonic voice of Desert Solitaire makes it 
difficult for opponents to identify and attack the 
center out of which Abbey's discourse flows; the 
multiple voices help defuse the resistance of the. 
skeptical reader...Because Abbey's celebratory tone 
bonds...to an ironic one which acknowledges the 
problematic status of a reverent attitude in the 
postmodern world, the book becomes an alloy of 
distin.ctive strength. xxv 
The so-called 'multiple voices' of both Abbey and 
Nietzsche are not separate devices after the fashion of 
Kierkegaard, but rather a manifestation of the enormous 
breadth of these two writers. They are, to paraphrase Whit­
man, 'vast, and contain multitudes.' This, the enormous, 
contradictory nature of which both Abbey and Nietzsche 
sees themselves as immanent in, is the source of this 
"postmodern," decentered method of speaking so central to 
both. Morris is correct in seeing this as a great strength. 
This is what is most 'basic' to Nietzschean metaphys­
ics, a critiqued metaphysics etched by blown sand, from the 
desert that is man's strength, his move through suffering to 
meaning-in-the.-world. The ability to see, to move as Abbey 
did outside the culture that created him and take up some­
thing that, while it is likely harder, is also surely better. As 
Nietzsche wrote in the Nachlass, "I also speak of a 'return to 
nature' although it is not actually a 'return back,' but an 
'advance towards' the strong, bright, frightful nature and 
naturalness of men who can play with great tasks, because 
they would become tired with small ones and feel dis­
gusted."xxvi The conscious move into the desert is, as it was 
for Abbey, a move chasing an abstract and therefore false 
ideal which in the end brings about the dissolution of such 
ideals by virtue of the sheer harsh force brought to bear on 
the subject. The desert, in Abbey and Nietzsche, is a purify­
ing place, cutting being-in-the-world down to just that, for 
its own sake. 
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